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opment significantly reduces the substitution relationship between trade credit
and bank credit and more generally decreases the influence of most firm-level
determinants for trade credit usage. These results are plausibly explained by a
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis started in 2008 and the subsequent Great Recession of 2008–
2009 represent the most recent examples of the real effects of a systemic bank-
ing crisis. World GDP decreased by 1.3% while global trade collapsed by 20% in
real terms following the sudden financial arrest, which froze global credit
markets. Access to bank credit rapidly went increasingly difficult for firms, in
a context where liquidity became extraordinarily scarce. This renewed the
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academic interest in trade credit, a preferential payment period granted by a
supplier to its client or a loan granted by a firm to another one. Some very recent
analyses suggest that, facing an unprecedented bank credit crunch, constrained
firms switched to trade credit to finance their activity (see, in particular, Garcia-
Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga 2013, on a panel of US firms between mid-2005
and the end of 2010; Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell 2012, on a
panel of over 40,000 Spanish firms from 1994 to 2008). Many previous articles
also suggest that trade and bank credit are substitutes. Meltzer (1960) is one of
the very first to put forward the theory that during periods of monetary restric-
tion, companies replace bank credit by trade credit. Breig (1994) emphasizes that
firms use trade credit more and more extensively as bank/company relationships
become more distant. Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-
Fernandez, and Udell (2008) also relate the demand for trade credit with the
difficulty of access to bank credit. Wilner (2000) and Cuñat (2007) put forward
another explanation, whereby suppliers may provide liquidity to customers
whenever they experience an idiosyncratic liquidity shock; therefore, trade
credit acts as a safety valve substituting other types of loans. Following Biais
and Gollier (1997), Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) observe that the trade
credit offering is explained above all by an informational advantage among
suppliers with regard to their clients, leading vendors to extend credit to buyers
on terms that they would not be able to receive from financial intermediaries.
Similarly, other researchers support the complementarity of trade and bank
credit1 (Cook 1999; Ono 2001). In particular, Garcia‐Appendini (2011) finds
evidence of a certification role of trade credit: banks are more likely to lend to
firms that have been granted trade credit by their suppliers and to firms that pay
higher proportions of their trade credit debts on time.
Whether trade and bank credit are complements or substitutes is a recurring
debate in the literature. This question is important, because the way firms can
access external finance to fund their growth has crucial macro-implications.
After Levine (2005), Aghion (2008) surveys empirical evidence regarding the
link between finance and growth and highlights that financial development has
a positive and significant influence on economic growth,2 probably because
1 Complementarity between bank and trade credits implies positive correlations between their
variations or at least, that, the decrease in one (because of, for example, a more difficult access
to bank credit) does not necessarily induce an increase in the other one (in that case, a more
intensive use of trade credit).
2 The positive link between finance and economic growths is challenged in recent contribu-
tions (Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza 2012; Rousseau and Wachtel 2011). But the level of financial
development in countries of interest in our study is much lower than the threshold at which
Arcand et al. (2012) find that financial development starts having a negative effect on growth.
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financial development reduces the external financing constraints on firms. In
this article, we precisely study the impact of financial development on the
relationship between trade and bank credit relying on a sample of more than
1,300 firms from six Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries: Algeria,
Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, and Syria. To our knowledge, no study has yet
been devoted to MENA countries, which, however, provide an excellent field of
coverage: the banking penetration rate (percentage of the population that have
at least one bank account) is still low (around 30% on average) and the share of
bank loans in the external financing of businesses barely exceeds 20%, even
though the productive structure is characterized by a high proportion of finan-
cially constrained small and medium enterprises. Most MENA economies have
fairly undeveloped financial systems and are still growing in terms of banking
penetration. The World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey confirms the difficulty
of access to credit for firms in this area: the percentage of businesses with a
bank loan was only 24% in 2009 (against 48% for firms in East Asia and Pacific
countries, 44% for those in Eastern European and Central Asia countries, 45%
for those in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 27% for those in South Asia).
Our findings can be summarized as follows: at first sight, results show that
the difficulty of gaining access to bank credit positively influences the use of
trade credit and thus demonstrate the substitutability of bank credit and trade
credit; similarly, the indicators of the quality of the firm’s financial structure
negatively influence the use of trade credit, emphasizing the utility of this form
of credit for companies in precarious financial health. However, additional
investigations tend to suggest that increased financial development significantly
reduces (and can even make disappear) the substitution relationship between
trade credit and bank credit and more generally decreases the influence of most
firm-level determinants for trade credit usage.
The interpretation of these aggregate results presents a familiar identifica-
tion issue in the trade credit literature: the observed trade credit is an equili-
brium result of supply and demand. One does not know a priori if the difference
in the use of trade credit could reflect the difference in demand or supply of
trade credit. In their study of the effect of financial crisis on trade credit in six
emerging economies, Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007) find that firms with
weaker financial conditions are more likely to reduce trade credit after the crisis.
They argue that the results are in favor of the supply-driven story, since it is
quite unlikely that the decrease in demand for trade credit after the crisis would
be related to a supplier’s financial condition. Our own conclusions in this article
reflect more a demand-driven phenomenon, as suggested by the results on our
credit access variable: when bank credit access gets increasingly difficult, the
use of trade credit also increases. Similarly, the signs on our two indicators of
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financial health are negative, implying that firms with higher cash flow or equity
will use less trade credit. This is more in favor of a demand-driven story (firms
trying to compensate bank credit with trade credit) than a supply-driven one,
since one does not see why suppliers would spontaneously provide more trade
credit, because bank credit is scarce, or because firms display a damaged
financial health (the opposite link would be much more plausible). This also
fits well with our main result regarding financial development: when the latter
increases, firms have better access to bank credit, and impact of this variable on
the demand for trade credit becomes less or not significant.
Our article is, therefore, related to the literature suggesting that both views
(trade and bank credit substitutes vs trade and bank credit complements) can be
reconciledwhen financial constraints (which are, all things equal, relatednegatively
to financial development) are taken into account. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004)
develop a contract model allowing bank and trade credit to be either complements
or substitutes. Among others, an important finding is that the importance of trade
credit compared to bank credit should be greater in less-developed credit markets,
where creditor protection is often weaker, and firms are undercapitalized due to
entrepreneurs’ lack of wealth. In that sense, our results can be understood as an
empirical test of this specific conclusionof theirmodel. An important contribution of
our article is, therefore, to provide micro-evidence of the impact of financial devel-
opment on the bank/trade credit relationship.
Our results are also consistentwith the fewarticleswhich have explored the link
with financial development (see Breig 1994, who compares France and Germany;
Fisman and Love 2003, who show that businesses use trade credit more extensively
in countries with undeveloped banking systems; Ge and Qiu 2007, on China). More
generally, our article expands the relatively small literature that have studied the
importance of trade credit in emerging economies, in particular, the transition
countries of Eastern and Central Europe (Coricelli 1996; Cook 1999; Berglöf and
Bolton 2002; Hammes 2003; Delannay and Weill 2004) and those of Asia (Love,
Preve, and Sarria-Allende 2007) and sub-Saharan Africa (Fafchamps, Pender, and
Robinson 1995; Biggs, Raturi, and Srivastavac 2002; Isaksson 2002).3
3 One should note that trade credit is a form of financing that is not specific to developing or
emerging countries. It is a widespread source of short-term external financing in the United
States and Europe. In fact, most empirical studies addressing this question focus on developed
countries, often using data from the United States (Elliehausen and Wolken 1993; Petersen and
Rajan 1994, 1997; Nilsen 2002) or Europe (Crawford 1992a, 1992b; Breig 1994; Deloof and Jegers
1996, 1999; Marotta 1997, 2001; Wilson, Singleton, and Summers 1999; Wilson and Summers
2002), and mainly highlighting problems of financial constraints, and advantages in terms of
transaction costs or cash flow to explain the demand for trade credit.
4 J. Couppey-Soubeyran and J. Héricourt
In the next section, we present our database and the variables of interest,
before discussing our general empirical methodology in Section 3. In Section 4,
we study the robustness of our empirical specifications to various subsamples
and estimation methods (especially, controlling for endogeneity). Section 5
presents our core results regarding the impact of financial development.
Finally, Section 6 contains robustness checks, and Section 7 provides conclud-
ing remarks.
2 Data and choice of variables
2.1 Database
The database of the World Bank’s survey on enterprises in developing coun-
tries (World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey4) is particularly well suited to
our study, since it gives information on the use of trade credit, access to
credit, and the financial health of businesses. The data include accounting
information such as turnover, intermediate consumption, payroll, capital
stock, investments, and other expenditure; more general information is also
available about shareholding structure, characteristics of the workforce, rela-
tions with competitors, clients, and suppliers, innovation, and the business
climate. In each country, industries were selected non-randomly in order to
focus on the main producing sectors. Within each industry, firms were
chosen randomly and their composition is, therefore, representative of the
population.
From this database, we extracted the MENA countries for which the
accounting data that we needed were all available. From the 11 MENA
countries5 surveyed by the World Bank, six countries in the MENA region
satisfied this availability and reliability constraint: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon,
Morocco, Oman, and Syria. The periods covered differed from one country to
the next, but were always between 1999 and 2004, that is 1999–2001 for Algeria,
2002–2003 for Egypt, 2003–2004 for Lebanon, and 2000–2002 for Morocco,
Oman, and Syria. World Bank surveys have admittedly been updated for
Algeria and Morocco in 2007, Egypt in 2008, and Lebanon and Syria in 2009.6
4 These surveys are available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
5 Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, West Bank of
Gaza, and Yemen.
6 No new survey is available for Oman.
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However, these surveys could not allow extending the dataset. Regarding
Algeria, Egypt Morocco, and Syria, the balance-sheet data required by our
study were either missing or insufficient (especially, information on the liabil-
ities side is absent). Concerning Lebanon, required balance-sheet data
were available for around 75 firms in 2007 and 2008, but other firm-level
information was missing.7 Therefore, restricting the sample to the 1999–2004
period over six countries emerged as the best option to maximize the number of
observations and the reliability of the results. Table 1 displays a few key
indicators which allow assessing the representativeness of the six countries of
our sample. Altogether, they represent on average 27% of MENA’s GDP and
almost half of its population. GDP per capita and, more importantly, ratio of
private credit over GDP (our measure of financial development, cf. Section 2.2)
display a significant heterogeneity, both within the sample and compared to
MENA as a whole. Last but not least, there does not seem to be any major
transformation of the financial system over the considered period: ratios of
domestic credit over GDP stay most of the time in the same order of magnitude;
significant increases are observed for Algeria and Syria, but financial develop-
ment remains at very low levels (respectively, 16 and 22.5%).8 Therefore, the
results we are going to extract over the 1999–2004 period appear to be fully
reliable and relevant.
To control for the potential influence of outliers, we restricted the
sample to firms that had declared positive figures for turnover and assets
and positive or null figures for debt and interest payments. We also excluded
observations in the 1% from the upper and lower tails of the distribution in
the regression variables. These cut-offs are aimed at eliminating extraordin-
ary firm shocks or coding errors. At the end, we obtain a database of 1,314
private firms9 for a maximum of 3,002 observations. All data collected in
national currencies are converted into Euros (by means of annual exchange
rates extracted from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)).
7 The location was missing, and more importantly, the industrial categories were very rough,
causing matching problems with the rest of the database.
8 Qualitatively identical trends can be observed for banking intermediation (i.e. the ratio of
domestic credit provided by banking sector over GDP) and financial market development (i.e.
the ratio of market capitalization over GDP). More details on these additional financial indica-
tors are available upon request to the authors.
9 There were very few state-owned companies in the initial database (hardly more than 1.5% of
the total, or around 40 firms). It was, therefore, not possible to conduct a sound empirical
analysis of this subsample. For this reason, we withdrew them from the database.
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Table 1: Macroeconomic indicators, 1999–2010.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Share of MENA countries GDP (%)
Algeria 6.02 5.84 5.89 6.04 6.14 6.06 6.05 5.83 5.71 5.57 5.61 5.55
Egypt, Arab
Rep.
10.64 10.64 10.83 10.85 10.65 10.40 10.32 10.42 10.62 10.84 11.16 11.23
Lebanon 1.91 1.84 1.88 1.90 1.87 1.88 1.81 1.72 1.76 1.83 1.95 2.00
Morocco 4.09 3.94 4.17 4.22 4.27 4.19 4.10 4.18 4.08 4.11 4.23 4.20
Oman 2.12 2.12 2.24 2.25 2.14 2.08 2.05 2.05 2.08 2.24 2.22 2.21
Syrian Arab
Rep.
2.11 2.06 2.13 2.21 2.11 2.12 2.14 2.12 2.13 2.12 2.21 2.19
All sample 26.89 26.44 27.14 27.47 27.18 26.73 26.47 26.31 26.39 26.72 27.38 27.36
Share of MENA countries population (%)
Algeria 9.82 9.77 9.72 9.67 9.62 9.58 9.53 9.47 9.42 9.36 9.31 9.27
Egypt, Arab
Rep.
21.68 21.64 21.61 21.59 21.56 21.53 21.49 21.43 21.37 21.30 21.24 21.21
Lebanon 1.20 1.20 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.13 1.12 1.11
Morocco 9.28 9.21 9.14 9.06 8.98 8.89 8.80 8.71 8.61 8.52 8.43 8.35
Oman 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.73
Syrian Arab
Rep.
5.08 5.11 5.16 5.22 5.27 5.32 5.35 5.35 5.34 5.34 5.34 5.34
All sample 47.80 47.66 47.54 47.43 47.33 47.21 47.05 46.83 46.60 46.37 46.17 46.01
(continued )
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Table 1: (Continued )
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP per capita (constant US dollars, 2000)
All MENA 2,905.26 3,002.15 2,994.67 2,999.14 3,091.67 3,230.56 3,331.90 3,454.03 3,552.45 3,650.71 3,640.81 3,731.47
Algeria 1,781.14 1,794.41 1,814.42 1,871.92 1,971.51 2,043.14 2,115.19 2,124.96 2,155.49 2,173.79 2,192.70 2,231.98
Egypt, Arab
Rep.
1,425.76 1,475.84 1,500.52 1,507.93 1,527.27 1,560.38 1,600.32 1,678.95 1,765.87 1,858.86 1,911.96 1,975.55
Lebanon 4,615.53 4,612.20 4,718.17 4,794.65 4,865.71 5,147.69 5,129.40 5,103.49 5,436.65 5,895.08 6,350.33 6,745.66
Morocco 1,267.80 1,271.81 1,351.27 1,379.69 1,450.12 1,502.88 1,530.85 1,632.13 1,658.86 1,733.53 1,797.41 1,844.35
Oman 8,342.81 8,774.93 9,369.33 9,511.06 9,404.44 9,550.96 9,723.22 10,006.30 10,392.29 11,385.64 11,191.81 11,345.43
Syrian Arab
Rep.
1,207.87 1,208.73 1,235.56 1,269.27 1,238.40 1,286.01 1,330.32 1,368.93 1,418.05 1,452.26 1,508.64 1,525.81
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
All MENA 40.23 38.46 41.90 42.45 41.28 40.63 41.69 41.57 45.88 46.63 52.74 53.19
Algeria 5.39 5.97 8.00 12.24 11.36 11.16 12.11 12.34 13.36 13.17 16.50 15.56
Egypt, Arab
Rep.
52.00 51.95 54.93 54.66 53.90 54.04 51.17 49.29 45.52 42.80 36.09 33.07
Lebanon 82.27 87.90 86.02 82.57 78.64 75.87 68.51 70.48 73.43 73.84 73.02 81.34
Morocco 47.70 51.00 44.55 43.38 42.41 42.60 46.15 48.65 58.39 63.24 64.74 68.65
Oman 46.09 36.78 39.13 39.08 36.94 34.35 30.83 31.07 35.71 35.32 48.21 42.93
Syrian Arab
Republic
9.20 8.30 7.74 7.87 10.10 11.65 14.76 14.88 15.11 17.56 19.65 22.51
Source: World Development Indicators.
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2.2 Variables of interest
We want to explain the determinants of trade credit usage by the firms in our
sample and to shed light on the relationship between bank and trade credits.
The observed variable we use is the ratio of accounts payable over total assets10
(or its binary counterpart, see below).
The cross-country dimension of our database allows us to study the relation-
ship between financial development and the use of trade credit, and especially
to study how the level of financial development influences the nature of the
relationship between trade credit and firm-level determinants. In this respect,
the financial development indicator we choose (focusing on the financial inter-
mediation aspect) is the ratio of credit to private sector to GDP. This indicator is
the most frequently used in the literature.11
The surveys used did not provide any information about the volume of bank
credit on the balance sheets of the firms surveyed (only the global debt of the
firms). However, a qualitative variable was available about the difficulty of
access to bank credit; this variable takes a value between 0 and 4 according
to whether the answer to the question “Is access to bank loans an obstacle to
business?” was “not at all, minor, moderate, major, or severe”. Therefore, this
variable records the respondent’s opinion about accessing bank credit. Hence,
concern may be raised regarding the subjectivity of this answer, which may not
reflect properly the enterprise’s productivity and its capacity to obtain finance.
To tackle this issue, we compute the coefficients of correlation between our
credit access variable and measures of productivity and financial strength
directly observable by the respondent (namely, labor productivity, defined as
the ratio of sales over the number of employees and firm’s equity and cash
flows). All three correlation coefficients are significant at the 5% level, and they
highlight that reported credit access difficulty is positively related to productiv-
ity and negatively to equity and cash flows (see also descriptive statistics in
Table 2). To sum up, the firms reporting a difficult access to bank credit are the
most performing ones but also the ones with small internal finance, that is, all
things equal, the firms crucially needing external finance for development
purpose. Hence, these reported difficulties in accessing bank credit seem to
reflect an objective need for it, and this variable provides a relevant measure-
ment of the degree to which firms are constrained in their access to bank credit.
10 Results are robust to alternative definitions of the dependent variable, like the ratio of
payables over sales or the log of payables.
11 See, among others, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000) and Beck (2002). Fisman and
Love (2003) also use this ratio as an indicator of financial development.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean SD Q1 Median Q3
All observations
1 if Accounts payable/Assets > 0, 0
otherwise
3,002 0.83 0.37 1 1 1
Accounts payable/Assets 3,002 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.11 0.27
Accounts receivable/Assets 3,002 0.24 0.34 0.04 0.19 0.36
1 if settled in the capital city, 0
otherwise
2,899 0.12 0.33 0 0 0
Ln(1+Age) 2,924 3.12 0.52 2.71 3.09 3.47
Size (Sales/Assets) 3,002 1.11 1.48 0.40 0.90 1.44
Labor productivity (Sales/Employee) 2,967 7.38 3.78 3.01 8.96 10.17
Credit access 3,002 2.59 1.62 1 3 4
Cash flow/Assets 2,341 0.46 2.90 0.01 0.03 0.12
Equity/Assets 2,908 0.62 3.50 0.20 0.38 0.64
Firms without trade credit
Accounts payable/Assets 516 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accounts receivable/Assets 516 0.09 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.08
1 if settled in the capital city,
0 otherwise
505 0.25 0.43 0 0 0
Ln(1+Age) 513 3.07 0.55 2.64 3.04 3.47
Size (Sales/Assets) 500 0.90 1.80 0.01 0.17 1.11
Labor productivity (Sales/Employee) 510 3.15 3.36 1.01 1.76 3.32
Credit access 516 1.73 1.77 0 2 4
Cash flow/Assets 241 5.12 38.49 0.13 0.61 2.00
Equity/Assets 488 1.40 8.35 0.24 0.62 0.98
Firms with trade credit Difference
Accounts payable/Assets 2,566 0.21 0.23 0.05 0.16 0.30 –44.02***
Accounts receivable/Assets 2,566 0.27 0.35 0.09 0.22 0.39 –16.12***
1 if settled in the capital city,
0 otherwise
2,470 0.10 0.30 0 0 0 7.29***
Ln(1+Age) 2,487 3.13 0.51 2.71 3.09 3.47 –2.33**
Size (Sales/Assets) 2,502 1.15 1.40 0.54 0.96 1.46 –2.99***
Labor productivity (Sales/Employee) 2,515 8.24 3.27 8.08 9.25 10.37 –31.03***
Credit access 2,566 2.76 1.53 2 3 4 –12.08***
Cash flow/Assets 2,149 0.34 3.15 0.01 0.02 0.08 5.39***
Equity/Assets 2,494 0.47 0.80 0.19 0.36 0.58 2.33**
Source: Authors’ computations from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Mean, standard deviation
(SD) and first (QI), second (Median), and third (Q3) quartiles of the distribution of the following
variables: a binary indicator coded 1 if the firm owes accounts payable, 0 otherwise; the ratio of
accounts payableover total assets; the presence in the capital city (abinary variable taking the value
of 1 if the firm is based in the capital city, 0 otherwise; the age of the firm (the logarithm of age plus
one), the size of the firm (the ratio of total sales over total assets); an indicator of labor productivity
(the ratio of total sales over the number of employees); the stock to total assets ratio; the accounts
receivable to total assets ratio; the ratio of cash flow over total assets; the ratio of shareholders’
equity over total assets; a bank credit access indicator taking a value between 0 and 4 according to
whether the answer to the question “Is access to bank loans an obstacle to business?” was “not at
all, minor, moderate, major, or severe”. The column “Difference” reports t-statistics for differences
in themeans of firm characteristics for firmswithout trade credit and thosewith trade credit. *** and
** represent significance at the 1 and 5% level, respectively.
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If bank and trade credits are substitutable, this variable should, therefore,
positively impact trade credit. Conversely, if bank and trade credits are comple-
mentary, this variable should negatively impact trade credit.
Similar to other trade credit studies which also use firm-level data, we
include the age of the firm (measured by the logarithm of age plus one), its
size (represented by the ratio of total sales over total assets12), and its presence
in the capital city (a binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm is based in the
capital city, 0 otherwise).13 The literature also typically estimates models where
the firm’s behavior (generally, its investment choices) is a function of the firm’s
cash flow. A significant impact of cash flow is generally attributed to the
imperfections of the financial markets, thus suggesting the presence of financial
constraints.14 We, therefore, use the ratio of cash flow over total assets, which
can be interpreted as an indication of the volume of funds that can be mobilized
on a very short-term basis by the firm. This indicator is widely used in the
literature (see Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox 1993). Secondly, we use the ratio of
shareholders’ equity over total assets, which can be interpreted as the firm’s
capacity to absorb losses and is, thus, more an indicator of long-term financial
soundness. Lastly, we also include two proxy variables for the volume of
transactions, the stock to total assets ratio, and the accounts receivable to
total assets ratio.
Settling expected signs a priori is not an easy task for some variables,
because of a well-known identification problem in the trade credit literature:
the difference in the use of trade credit could reflect the difference in demand or
supply of trade credit. Regarding the age, on the demand side, new companies
have limited access to bank credit (owing to information asymmetry problems),
and thus tend to seek more trade credit (see Berger and Udell 1995, 1998). At the
same time, on the supply side, older firms will also have greater chances to
access trade credit (because of reputation effects). The ambiguity is identical for
size: on the demand side, large companies enjoy a better (and/or) higher
12 Our results are robust to the use of alternative measures for firm size, such as the number (in
natural logarithm) of employees or the logarithm of total sales. All results are available upon
request to the authors.
13 See, among others, Delannay and Weill (2004) and Ge and Qiu (2007). Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) show that age and size are useful predictors of financial constraints, and more exogen-
ous than the widely used balance-sheet variables. The presence in the capital city is actually
another proxy for information research costs and information asymmetry issues: the firms based
in the capital city are closer to a larger set of banks (especially in developing countries, where
banks are very concentrated in the main cities) and should, therefore, have less difficult access
to bank credit
14 See, among others, the survey by Hubbard (1998).
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reputation and offer better guarantees, and so have an easier access to external
financing and less need for trade credit (Berger and Udell 1998, 2002; Delannay
and Weill 2004; Ge and Qiu 2007); but for the very same reasons (reputation,
better guarantees), suppliers may be inclined to provide more credit to these
large companies, also granted with such a market power that is difficult to
refuse them trade credit when they ask for it (Brennan, Macksimovic, and
Zechner 1988; Mian and Smith 1992).15 The same line of reasoning applies to
our proxies for financial health: an increase of cash flow or equity over assets
can impact positively the supply of trade credit (trade credit suppliers are more
confident of financially sound firms) or negatively the demand of trade credit (a
better financial health decreases the need for financing through trade credit, and
therefore the demand for this form of financing).
Similarly, the location in the capital city may impact positively or negatively
the use of trade credit: if there is a substitutability (resp. complementarity)
relationship between bank and trade credits, then these firms should use less
(resp. more) trade credit. In addition, there is another effect to take into account:
firms located in the capital city are more likely to offer trade credit (Klapper and
Randall 2010). Regarding transactional variables, however, the prediction is
pretty clear: inventories and special payment deadlines granted to clients both
increase with the volume of transactions, positively influencing use of trade
credit.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics, first those on the total sample,
then those on firms that do not use trade credit and lastly on those that do.
Reported in the column “Difference”, tests of means equality highlight the
relevance of this division: t-statistics show that the null of equality is strongly
rejected in all cases. The anecdotal evidence they show is interesting. Firstly,
firms using trade credit are on average (slightly) older and bigger, consistently
with supply-driven effects. They are also (much) more labor productive than
firms which do not use trade credit. In financial terms, these firms also show
much lower average cash flow and equity to assets ratios (respectively, 0.34 vs
5.12 and 0.47 vs 1.40) and state that they have much greater difficulty gaining
access to bank credit than the others (2.76 vs 1.73). Appearing to be likely
demand-driven (cf. below), these effects would seem to support the hypothesis
of substitution between trade credit and bank credit which will be more formally
tested in our econometric analysis.
15 Authors such as Petersen and Rajan (1997), Summers and Wilson (2002) and Gama, Mateus,
and Teixeira (2008) for developed countries and Fafchamps, Pender, and Robinson (1995),
Biggs, Raturi, and Srivastavac 2002 and Isaksson (2002) for developing countries in sub-
Saharan Africa have shown that the use of trade credit increases with the size of the firm.
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3 Empirical setting
3.1 Baseline estimated model
We start by studying the impact of previously mentioned determinants on both the
probability of owing trade credit and the volume of trade credit used relying on the
two base specifications presented below. Besides, the combination of both equa-
tions will help us to identify potential selection problems, if any (see Section 3.2).
As the fact of owing trade credit is a discrete variable by definition equal to
0 or 1, the probit model is appropriate. Hence, we define (TC/Assets)bin i,t as a
binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm owes trade credit, 0 otherwise.
Using maximum likelihood, we estimate the probability of owing trade credit for
firm i (belonging to sector k) during year t based on the following equation:
TC
Assets
 
bin i;t
¼
1 if α
1
D
i
þ β
1
A
i
þ χ
1
S
i;t
þ λ
1;i
Ti;t þ χ1Ci þ γ1Ωi;t þ ηk þ θt þ c1 þ "i;t > 0
0 otherwise
(
½1
where εi,t follows a normal distribution.
The impact of the explanatory variables on the volume of trade credit owed
is estimated by replacing the dependent variable in eq. [1] by the ratio of
accounts payable over total assets (TC/Assets)i,t. The estimated relationship is
a standard linear equation which can be written as follows:
TC
Assets
 
i;t
¼ α2Di þ β2Ai þ χ2Si;t þ λ2;iTi;t þ κ2Ci þ γ2Ωi;t þ ηk þ θt þ νi þ c2 þ μi;t
½2
where Di corresponds to the firm’s presence in the capital city, Ai to its age, and
Si,t to the ratio of total sales over total assets as a proxy for its size; Ti,t is a vector
containing the transaction variables (receivables to total assets and stock to total
assets), whereas Ci is the access to credit indicator. Ωi,t alternatively corresponds
to one of the two variables representing the firm’s financial health, cash flow/
total assets and equity/total assets. ηk and θt are dummy variables designed
to capture unobservable characteristics at the sectoral16 and time levels,
16 These are especially important, since the use of trade credit may vary substantially across
sectors. The sample distribution of firms across 2-digit industries is available upon request to
the authors. One could argue that trade credit terms are also country-specific. In Table 6, we
report estimates with country dummies (see columns (c), (e), and (g)), with results identical to
the ones produced by our main specification.
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respectively. Lastly, νi is an i.i.d. random term designed to capture unobservable
heterogeneity at the firm level.17 This formulation offers continuity with the
studies by Elliehausen and Wolken (1993) and Wilson and Summers (2002)
and is very similar to other empirical work on the subject (see Delannay and
Weill 2004; Ge and Qiu 2007).
Note that the presence in the capital city is not provided for firms in Algeria
and Oman; age and the ratio of cash flow over assets are also unavailable for
Syria and a significant number of Egyptian firms. Since we need all six countries
of the database to provide a sound answer to our key concern (i.e. the impact of
financial development on the bank/trade credit relationship), the estimates
implying financial development will be performed on a specification without
age and the presence in the capital city in the right-hand side variables.
Preliminary regressions will show that estimates on other explanatory variables
are robust to different specifications and subsamples.
3.2 Econometric issues
The empirical specifications that we selected contain several explanatory vari-
ables which were entered identically for all the years at our disposal: presence in
the capital city, age of the firm, and access to credit. These variables are, thus,
time-invariant. Additionally, the unobserved individual heterogeneity at the firm
level raises the problem of the choice between fixed and random effects. The
first choice raises a problem of perfect multicollinearity with the time-invariant
regressors and is anyway impossible to implement in the context of eq. [1].18 The
choice of a random effect probit circumvents this problem, but proved to be
unreliable again in eq. [1].19 We, therefore, decided to estimate eq. [1] mainly
with a pooled probit including year- and sector-level dummies; a robustness
check based on Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with firm-level random effects,
controlling for unobservable heterogeneity at the firm level, is also performed.
Likewise, eq. [2] is estimated using GLS with firm-level random effects.
The possibility of an endogeneity issue coming from a simultaneity bias
between the dependent variable and some right-hand side variables is an
17 Note that this term is included in eq. [2], but not in eq. [1], due to insufficient variability. See
the following subsection for further details.
18 This is because of the incidental parameters problem, see Wooldridge (2002, 484) for more
details on this matter.
19 Since our sample contains 2 or 3 years per firm (cf. Section 2.1), we are left with an
insufficient time variance to perform a reliable random effect panel probit estimation.
Basically, convergence is not achieved.
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important potential problem. The exogeneity of age and presence in the city is
not in doubt. Similarly, our measure of access to bank credit is a response to a
survey question and not the amount of bank credit in a firm’s balance sheet.
This qualitative measure of financial constraints is much less subject to endo-
geneity problems compared to other common used measures in the literature
like bank debt on firm’s balance sheet.20 However, the hypothesis of reverse
causality for the size, transaction, and financial structure should not be
neglected. The use of trade credit and the amount of sales, stocks, trade credit
granted, and indicators of financial health are likely to be simultaneously driven
by common shocks. Empirical literature uses Instrumental Variables (IV) tech-
niques to solve the endogeneity bias, using mostly lags of regressors as instru-
ments. Finding instruments that are both exogenous and sufficiently correlated
with the endogenous regressors can, however, prove to be a difficult task.
We believe that our database contains sufficient information to overcome
these problems. We decide to opt for a set of instruments mixing second-order
lags of continuous regressors, Rajan and Zingales (1998) sectoral financial
dependence indicator interacted with the level of financial development at the
national level and a dummy indicating if the manager of the firm is also its main
shareholder. Considering the short panel we have, the second lags of current
period regressors appear as sufficiently far in the past to be truly exogenous to
the dependent variable and still strongly correlated to the potentially endogen-
ous regressors. The two additional instruments we use were selected for the
strong influence they have on the financial structure. Strongly correlated with
financial constraints (Rajan and Zingales 1998), the dependence on external
finance at the sectoral level interacted with financial development at the country
level is per se exogenous to firm-level behavior. Indeed, these indicators are
computed using data on all publicly traded U.S. companies. Rajan and Zingales
(1998) have pointed out that the United States have one of the most advanced
and sophisticated financial systems, so that the values for US firms reflect the
technology-specific component of external finance needs, or what can be called
the finance content of an industry. It is likely that measuring these indices in the
MENA countries context would lead to different values, reflecting the fact that
20 We thank one referee for bringing this point to our attention. In unreported estimates
(available upon request), we did instrument the credit access variable with the same set of
instruments than other regressors (second lags of continuous regressors, sectoral financial
dependence*financial development and a dummy indicating if the manager of the firm is also
the main shareholder, see below). In most cases, this led to smaller Durbin–Wu–Hausman
statistics and higher p-values, indicating an even greater impossibility of rejecting the null of
exogeneity. Therefore, the diagnostics regarding endogeneity reported in the article must be
considered as rather strict and careful.
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firms organize production differently in a credit-constrained environment. Thus,
such measures would be endogenous to financial development in these coun-
tries, whereas measures based on US firms’ data appear by construction exo-
genous in this respect.
Regarding the ownership of the firm by its manager, entrepreneurial firms
(where entrepreneur and manager is actually the same person) are not moni-
tored by external investors and are not constrained by disclosure obligations. In
this perspective, these firms are more prone to undertake risky projects (DeLoof
and Jegers 1999) and should be more credit constrained. Once again, it is very
unlikely that this variable should be concerned by reverse causality from the
dependent variable, since the use of trade credit has no reason to influence the
ownership structure of the firm. To sum up, we have all the reasons to believe
that our instruments are theoretically valid.
Since we want to ensure that our results are free from any simultaneity bias,
we, therefore, perform IV estimation, relying on IV probit for eq. [1] and two-
stage least squares (2SLS) for eq. [2]. More precisely, we have three to four first-
stage equations, depending on the specification, where sales over assets, stock
over assets, accounts receivable over assets, cash flow over assets, and equity
over assets are alternatively the dependent variables, regressed on the other
right-hand side variables (included instruments) and on the set of (excluded)
instruments described above. As our sample contains 2 or 3 years per firm, both
IV probit and 2SLS are, therefore, performed over a single year.21
We also check the robustness of our baseline estimates to another source of
endogeneity, namely, a potential selection bias regarding the volume of trade
credit used, due to a factor that would be absent from our estimation. Indeed,
some firms may, all things being equal, use more trade credit due to a specific
characteristic. For the above-mentioned reasons, one can easily think of the
sectoral financial dependence interacted with financial development as a selec-
tion variable: firms in more financially dependent sectors may need, all things
equal, more trade credit; symmetrically, when financial development increases,
firms in more financially dependent sectors have a better access to bank credit,
needing less trade credit. Both phenomena should influence the probability of
having trade credit, but not the total amount. For similar reasons, the fact that
the manager is also the firm’s main shareholder that may similarly create a
problem of non-random sampling: because they are more prone to undertake
21 As an additional robustness check for the endogeneity of the credit access variable in eq. [2],
we also implemented a treatment effects model for studying the effect of an endogenous
treatment (here, the credit access) on another endogenous continuous variable (the volume of
trade credit owed). Results are qualitatively identical to the ones presented here.
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risky projects (DeLoof and Jegers 1999), these firms should be more constrained
in their access to bank credit. All things equal, their probability of relying on
trade credit should be higher, but not necessarily their amount of trade credit
payables over assets.
In both cases, the problem can be solved by a two-step Heckman procedure,
using these two variables (namely, “sectoral financial dependence  private
credit/GDP” and a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the manager of the firm
is also its main shareholder, 0 otherwise) as selection variables, one after the
other. On the statistical side, these variables display the necessary features of
selection variables (cf. Wooldridge 2002; see Table 5): they influence only the
selection equation (i.e. the probability of owing trade credit (eq. [1]) and not the
equation of interest (i.e. the volume of trade credit owed (eq. [2]).
Besides, the structure of our data confronts us with the problem of error
clustering. As well as the usual White correction for heteroskedasticity, we also
correct for the correlation of errors within firms using the Froot (1989) correction.
Finally, to check for potential multicollinearity among regressors, we com-
pute the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each regressor. The VIF shows how
the presence of multicollinearity inflates estimator variance. The larger the VIF
value, the more collinear the variables will be. A common rule is to consider a
VIF exceeding 10 as an indicator of high collinearity of the considered variable
(Gujarati 2004). For all our variables, the VIF is, on average, 1.58, confirming
that our variables do not have any multicollinearity problems.
4 On the determinants of the use of
trade credit
4.1 Credit access, financial structure, and trade credit:
baseline estimates
Table 3 presents the results of the baseline estimations of eq. [1], that is, the
impact of firm-specific control variables (presence in the capital city, age, and
size), and transaction, quality of financial structure, and access to credit vari-
ables on the probability of owing trade credit. Columns (a)–(d) show the results
without using our financial variables; columns (e), (f), and (i) use the first
financial proxy, that is the ratio of cash flows over total assets; columns (g),
(h), and (j) contain the estimations using the second proxy, that is, the ratio of
equity over total assets. Reported coefficients on columns (a)–(h) are estimated
Trade Credit, Bank Credit and Financial Development 17
Table 3: Credit access, financial structure, and the probability of using trade credit.
Dep. Var: Pr
(TC/Assets>0)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Capital city –0.091*** –0.096*** –0.034** –0.102*** –0.109*** –0.122***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.015) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Age 0.025* 0.026** 0.012* 0.028** 0.030** 0.029 0.039**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
Sales/Assets 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.007 –0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Stock/Assets –0.001 –0.000 –0.001 –0.000 0.003 0.001 –0.004 –0.003 0.015 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.018)
Receivables/
Assets
0.293*** 0.284*** 0.294*** 0.279*** 0.128*** 0.118*** 0.301*** 0.287*** 0.105*** 0.104***
(0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.045) (0.024) (0.023) (0.047) (0.045) (0.023) (0.023)
Credit access
(0–4)
0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.034***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Cash flow/
Assets
–0.004** –0.003* –0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Equity/Assets –0.013** –0.012** –0.008***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
Observations 3,002 2,899 2,924 2,897 2,341 2,313 2,830 2,803 2,313 2,248
Number of
firms
1,314 1,265 1,279 1,264 1,167 1,151 1,239 1,224 1,151 1,121
Estimation Pooled probit Pooled probit GLS-RE
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Amemiya–
Lee–Newey
stat.
0.128 0.326 0.102 0.109 0.006 0.143
p-Value 0.938 0.849 0.749 0.947 0.997 0.931
Wald stat. of
exogeneity
5.40 5.51 3.09 3.13 10.03 9.92
p-Value 0.145 0.138 0.543 0.537 0.040 0.042
Pseudo-R2/R2 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.29 0.20 0.20
Notes: Columns (a)–(h): All coefficients estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of a pooled probit model. Marginal effects computed at means
for continuous regressors. Columns (i) and (j): All coefficients estimates are GLS estimates with firm-level random effects. In all estimations, the
dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1, if the firm owes accounts payable, 0 otherwise. Right-hand side variables include: the presence in
the capital city (a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is based in the capital city, 0 otherwise); the age of the firm (the logarithm of age
plus one), the size of the firm (the ratio of total sales over total assets); the stock to total assets ratio; the accounts receivable to total assets ratio; a
bank credit access indicator taking a value between 0 and 4 according to whether the answer to the question “Is access to bank loans an obstacle
to business?” was “not at all, minor, moderate, major, or severe”. Columns (a)–(d) show the results without using our financial variables; columns
(e), (f), and (i) use the first financial health proxy, that is, the ratio of cash flows over total assets; columns (g), (h), and (j) contain the estimations
using the second proxy, that is, the ratio of equity over total assets. Specifications without capital city (columns (a), (c), (e), and (g) and age ((a), (b),
and (e)) are also estimated. All estimations include year and sector dummies. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Intercept not reported.
Froot (1989) correction for firm-level cluster correlation. Time-varying regressors instrumented with second-order lags, a dummy variable taking the
value 1 when the manager of the firm is also the main shareholder and sectoral financial dependence (cf. Rajan and Zingales, 1998)  financial
development (private credit/GDP) for computing overidentifying and exogeneity statistics in columns (a) and (d) to (h). The Amemiya–Lee–Newey
statistic is distributed as Chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of other identifying restrictions (=number of instruments minus
the number of regressors), under the null that the instruments are valid. The Wald statistic is distributed as Chi-square with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of regressors tested, under the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Significance levels: *10, **5, and ***1%.
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using maximum likelihood and are marginal effects computed at means for
continuous regressors. Columns (i) and (j) report GLS-random effect estimates.
Finally, specifications without capital city (columns (a), (c), (e), and (g)) and age
((a), (b), and (e)) are also estimated. Estimates on other variables remain
identical or very close in all cases, showing that our results are robust to sample
variations.22
Estimated coefficients display signs that are fully consistent with the
hypothesis of substitutability between bank and trade credits: the more difficult
the credit access, the higher the probability of using trade credit. Besides,
coefficients on our financial-structure quality indicators are negative and sig-
nificant in all estimations. This reflects the fact that firms with higher cash flow
or equity will use less trade credit. Both results seem to reflect a demand-driven
phenomenon: when bank credit access gets increasingly difficult, or when
financial health deteriorates, firms try to compensate the lack of internal (cash
flow or equity) or external (bank credit) finance with trade credit. Additionally,
firms located in the capital city have a lower probability of using trade credit.
Size does not seem to play a significant role, whereas the supply-side reputation
effect (positive impact of age) seems to dominate for accessing trade credit. Only
one of the two transaction variables has a significant influence: unlike the stock
to assets variable, the ratio of receivables to assets has a significant and positive
influence on the use of trade credit. One of the most decisive factors in the use of
trade credit is also quite simply the fact that firms are themselves also trade
creditors (the measured marginal effect is by far the highest).
Table 4 shows the results on the volume of trade credit used, that is, for
eq. [2]. Columns (a)–(d) present the results without using our financial proxies;
columns (e)–(h) add the ratio of cash flow over assets, and columns (i)–(l)
present the ratio of equity over assets. Columns (b), (f), and (j) include the
presence in the capital city, and columns (c), (g), and (k) include the age.
Regarding reverse causality concerns, columns (d), (h), and (l) present 2SLS
estimates, which will be commented on the next subsection.
These estimates display very similar features with the ones described above.
It can be noted that effects are qualitatively identical for the capital city, credit
access, and financial health variables, confirming both the substitutability rela-
tionship between bank and trade credits and the relevance of a demand-side
story in understanding these effects. Similarities are also very strong concerning
the transaction variables: only the receivables to assets ratio has a robustly
significant and positive impact, even stronger than for eq. [1].
22 This also shows that our results are not driven by a particular country, which was also
confirmed on by estimates dropping each country one by one.
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Table 4: Credit access, financial structure, and the volume of trade credit.
Dep. Var: TC/Assets (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Capital city –0.065*** –0.073*** –0.069***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Age –0.015* –0.019* –0.014
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
Sales/Assets 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.061*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.103*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.091***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.020)
Stock/Assets –0.001 –0.001 –0.001* 0.133*** 0.059 0.064 0.060 0.114** –0.001 0.000 –0.000 0.082*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.043) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.049)
Receivables/Assets 0.290*** 0.290*** 0.289*** 0.305*** 0.272*** 0.271*** 0.273*** 0.278*** 0.292*** 0.291*** 0.290*** 0.205***
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.055) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.058) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095) (0.062)
Credit access (0–4) 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.012** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010** 0.012** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.007*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cash flow/Assets –0.012*** –0.011*** –0.012*** –0.439**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.211)
Equity/Assets –0.002* –0.003* –0.002* –0.235***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.038)
Observations 3,002 2,899 2,924 568 2,341 2,314 2,340 516 2,908 2,805 2,830 513
Number of firms 1,314 1,265 1,279 568 1,167 1,152 1,166 516 1,274 1,225 1,239 513
Estimation GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE 2SLS GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE 2SLS GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE 2SLS
Hansen stat. 0.208 0.044 0.081
p-Value 0.901 0.833 0.776
Kleibergen–Paap
stat.
64.64 12.30 41.86
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Table 4: (Continued )
Dep. Var: TC/Assets (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Critical value (5%) 12.20 12.20 12.20
Critical value (10%) 7.77 7.77 7.77
Critical value (20%) 5.35 5.35 5.35
Durbin–Wu–
Hausman stat.
3.982 6.198 6.800
p-Value 0.263 0.185 0.147
R2 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.16 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.14 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.23
Notes: Columns (a)–(c), (e)–(g) and (i)–(k): All coefficients estimates are GLS estimates with firm-level random effects and year dummies. Columns (d),
(h), and (l): All coefficients estimates are 2SLS estimates. In all estimations, the dependent variable is the ratio of accounts payable over total assets.
Right-hand side variables include: the presence in the capital city (a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is based in the capital city, 0
otherwise); the age of the firm (the logarithm of age plus one), the size of the firm (the ratio of total sales over total assets); the stock to total assets
ratio; the accounts receivable to total assets ratio; a bank credit access indicator taking a value between 0 and 4 according to whether the answer to
the question “Is access to bank loans an obstacle to business?” was “not at all, minor, moderate, major, or severe”. Columns (a)–(d) present the
results without using our financial proxies; columns (e)–(h) add the ratio of cash flow over total assets, and columns (i)–(l) the ratio of shareholders’
equity over total assets. Columns (b), (f), and (j) include the presence in the capital city, and columns (c), (g), and (k) include the age. All estimations
include sector dummies. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Intercept not reported. Froot (1989) correction for firm-level cluster correla-
tion. Time-varying regressors instrumented with second-order lags, a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the manager of the firm is also the main
shareholder and sectoral financial dependence (cf. Rajan and Zingales 1998)  financial development (private credit/GDP) for computing over-
identifying and exogeneity statistics in columns (d), (h), and (l). Therefore, 2SLS are estimated over a single year and firms’ individual effects cannot
enter the estimation. The Hansen statistic is distributed as Chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of other identifying restrictions
(¼number of instruments minus the number of regressors), under the null that the instruments are valid. The Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic for weak
instrumentation with critical values based on a 5, 10, and 20% 2SLS bias at the 5% significance level (see Stock and Yogo, 2005). The Durbin–Wu–
Hausman statistic is distributed as Chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors tested, under the null hypothesis of
exogeneity. Significance levels: *10, **5, and ***1%.
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However, the age of the firm does now negatively influence the volume of
trade credit used, with a weak significance, however. This can be interpreted
from the demand side: older companies suffer less financial constraints and
have easier access to other forms of external finance, and therefore need less
trade credit. Besides, whereas it was previously not significant, the size of the
firm now significantly and positively impacts the use of trade credit. The inter-
pretation in terms of demand- or supply-driven effects is not straightforward, but
the result may be a consistent with supply-driven story: suppliers are more
prone to grant trade credit to bigger companies, which enjoy a better reputation
and have more collateral to offer as security.
4.2 Robustness to endogeneity (simultaneity and
selection bias)
For both equations, endogeneity concerns were tackled using IV. Several stan-
dard tests of statistical robustness are reported in columns (a), (d), (e) (f), (g),
and (h) in Table 3, and in columns (d), (h), and (l) in Table 4, with diagnostics
on the specification tested in each considered column. We systematically check
the validity of our instruments by testing the null hypothesis that the over-
identifying restrictions are valid, using the Amemiya–Lee–Newey statistic for eq.
[1] and the heteroskedastic and clustering robust Hansen’s J-statistic for eq. [2].
In all cases, test statistics are largely insignificant, indicating that the orthogon-
ality of our instruments and the error terms cannot be rejected, and thus that our
choice of instruments is appropriate in this respect. We also report the F-stat
form of the Kleibergen–Paap statistic, the heteroskedastic and clustering robust
version of the Cragg–Donald statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) as a
test for weak instruments. All statistics are situated above the 5% critical value,
confirming that our set of instruments is not afflicted by the weak instrument
problem. Turning to exogeneity concerns, both Wald (eq. [1]) and Durbin–Wu–
Hausman (eq. [2]) tests cannot reject the null of exogeneity in almost all
specifications, casting some doubts on the possibility of reverse causality in
the data at hand. Actually, the only specification raising concerns is eq. [1] when
including the ratio of equity over assets. We do not consider this as a major
concern, since results are not qualitatively affected for this specification when
using alternative estimators, based on predetermined values for instance (see
Table 11 in Section 6.3). Under these circumstances, it seems highly debatable to
rely only on IV estimates, since they are less efficient than standard estimates
(cf. Pagan 1984). Based on standard pooled probit and GLS estimations in order
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to preserve degrees of freedom, the results presented in the next subsections
should, thus, be considered as fully reliable.
Table 5 tests the robustness of eq. [2] in the framework of a two-step Heckman
selectionmodel.23 The latter considers the possibility of another type of bias, coming
from an omitted factor affecting only eq. [1], in our case, the sectoral financial
dependence interacted with financial development (columns (a)–(f)) and the fact
that the firm manager is also the main shareholder (columns (g)–(l)). Columns (a),
(d), (g), and (j) show the estimates of the probit-selection equation (i.e. eq. [1]),
including the selection variable, and columns (b), (e), (h), and (k) report the estimates
of the equation of interest (i.e. eq. [2]), still with the selection variable. Together, these
estimates show that the two variableswe chose for testing selectionwere appropriate
on the statistical ground: both are always significant in the selection equation, and
almostnever in the equationof interest (cf.Wooldridge2002)–only incolumn (e), the
sectoral financial dependence interactedwith financial development appearsweakly
significant at the 10% level.
Columns (c), (f), (i), and (l) display the estimates of eq. [2] including the
(inverse of) Mills Ratio. The latter is systematically non-significant when the
selection variable is the dummy “manager¼main shareholder” and is signifi-
cant in one specification over two (the one including the cash flow over assets
ratio) when the selection variable is the sectoral financial dependence interacted
with financial development. This result is not robust on the enlarged subsample
including the equity over assets ratio. Evidence in favor of selection (condition-
ally to the exclusion restrictions) appears, therefore, rather weak, confirming
that the estimations previously shown are reliable in that respect.
5 On the impact of financial development24
So far, our results have shown that better financial health tended to reduce the
use of trade credit, while the latter increased with the difficulty of access to bank
23 Estimates were performed on complete specifications in order to minimize the possibility of
an additional omitted variable bias, in a context where firm-level effects cannot be implemen-
ted. Results on specifications without the presence in capital city and age were not reported for
the sake of space, but remain available upon request to the authors. They are qualitatively
identical to those herein.
24 As previously indicated, the estimates implying financial development are performed on a
specification without age and the presence in the capital city in the right-hand side variables in
order to ensure that our analysis involves all six countries of the sample. We checked that our
results remained robust when adding the presence in the capital city and the age of the firm.
This check is available upon request to the authors.
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Table 5: Trade credit, credit access, and financial structure: Heckman selection model.
Dep. Var. Pr(TC/
Assets>0)
TC/Assets TC/Assets Pr(TC/
Assets>0)
TC/Assets TC/Assets Pr(TC/
Assets>0)
TC/Assets TC/Assets Pr(TC/
Assets>0)
TC/Assets TC/Assets
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Capital city –0.027** –0.082*** –0.070*** –0.089*** –0.077*** –0.061*** –0.022* –0.082*** –0.077*** –0.082*** –0.080*** –0.079***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.030) (0.015) (0.019) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.031) (0.013) (0.015)
Age 0.008 –0.036*** –0.039*** 0.022* –0.019* –0.024** 0.009 –0.040* –0.043*** 0.018 –0.020** –0.022**
(0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Sales/Assets 0.002 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.002 0.022** 0.021** 0.001 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.001 0.024** 0.024**
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011)
Stock/Assets –0.001 0.041 0.041 –0.004 –0.004 –0.002 0.000 0.082*** 0.081*** –0.005 0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.044) (0.043) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.029) (0.029) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
Receivables/
Assets
0.123*** 0.216*** 0.191*** 0.342*** 0.190** 0.156* 0.131*** 0.263*** 0.243*** 0.366*** 0.251*** 0.242***
(0.022) (0.062) (0.069) (0.039) (0.080) (0.091) (0.023) (0.033) (0.038) (0.040) (0.029) (0.038)
Credit access
(0–4)
0.005*** 0.007** 0.005 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.008** 0.004** 0.006 0.004 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Cash flow/
Assets
–0.002 –0.019*** –0.016*** –0.002 0.017*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Equity/
Assets
–0.010** –0.019*** –0.015 –0.008* –0.021*** –0.021***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Sect.dep.
*priv. cred/
GDP
–0.235* –0.075 –0.433*** –0.235*
(0.077) (0.131) (0.123) (0.118)
Manager =
main
shareholder
0.028** 0.006 0.058*** 0.022
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013)
Mills ratio –0.440 –0.392 –0.268 –0.086
(0.187) (0.248) (0.171) (0.127)
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Table 5: (Continued )
Dep. Var. Pr(TC/
Assets>0)
TC/Assets TC/Assets Pr(TC/
Assets>0)
TC/Assets TC/Assets Pr(TC/
Assets>0)
TC/Assets TC/Assets Pr(TC/
Assets>0)
TC/Assets TC/Assets
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Observations 2,269 2,269 2,269 2,731 2,731 2,731 2,237 2,237 2,237 2,670 2,671 2,672
Number of
firms
1,107 1,107 1,107 1,184 1,184 1,184 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,150 1,151 1,152
Estimation Heckman two-step selection model Heckman two-step selection model
Selection
variable
Sectoral Index of financial dependence  private credit/GDP 1 if the manager of the firm is also the main shareholder, 0 otherwise
Pseudo–R2/R2 0.33 0.17 0.18 0.32 0.21 0.21 0.34 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.22 0.22
Notes: Columns (a), (d), (g), and (j): the dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if the firm owes accounts payable, 0 otherwise; coefficients
estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of a pooled probit model. Marginal effects computed at means for continuous regressors. Columns (b),
(c), (e), (f), (h), (i), (k), and (l): the dependent variable is the ratio of accounts payable over total assets; estimations are based on ordinary least
squares. Right-hand side variables include: the presence in the capital city (a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is based in the capital
city, 0 otherwise); the age of the firm (the logarithm of age plus one), the size of the firm (the ratio of total sales over total assets); the stock to total
assets ratio; the accounts receivable to total assets ratio; a bank credit access indicator taking a value between 0 and 4 according to whether the
answer to the question “Is access to bank loans an obstacle to business?” was “not at all, minor, moderate, major, or severe”. Columns (a)–(c) and
(g)–(i) also include the ratio of cash flow over total assets, and columns (d)–(f) and (j)–(l) add the ratio of shareholders’ equity over total assets.
Columns (a), (b), (d), and (e) include also in the RHS the sectoral financial dependence (cf. Rajan and Zingales 1998)  financial development (private
credit/GDP). Columns (g), (h), (j), and (h) include in the RHS a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the manager of the firm is also the main
shareholder. Columns (c), (f), (i), and (1) add in the RHS the inverse of Mills ratio computed from the first step probit estimates of columns (a), (d), (g),
and (j). All estimations include year and sector dummies. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Intercept not reported. Froot (1989)
correction for firm-level cluster correlation. Significance levels: *10, **5, and ***1%.
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credit. In this context, a reduction in financial constraints at national level, for
example by raising the level of financial development, should reduce the role of
financial health and the difficulty of access to bank credit in terms of its
determination.
In order to assess the relevance and importance of these effects, Table 6
presents estimations from eq. [2] including alternatively country dummies (col-
umns (c) and (e)) and financial development (columns (a), (b), (d), and (f)),25
and interaction terms between this indicator and the size (columns (b) and (c)),
credit access (all columns), and financial health variables (cash flow over assets
in columns (d) and (e) and equity over assets in columns (f) and (g)).
Financial development significantly reduces the use of trade credit. Several
other results appear to be particularly interesting: the positive influence of
difficulty of access to credit on the use of trade credit is no longer significant
when financial development is introduced among the explanatory variables. Nor
is it significant when access to bank credit is interacted with financial develop-
ment. We also observe that the interacted terms between our indicators of
financial health and financial development (positive and significant) give an
interesting insight: they mean that firms with better financial health use rela-
tively more trade credit when financial development is higher.
We took the analysis further by splitting the sample around the median of
financial development and formally testing the equality of coefficients over the
two subsamples (one “high”, above the financial development median, and the
other “low”, below this same median).26 Columns (a)–(d) focus on the basic
specification, columns (e) and (f) include the cash flow over assets ratio, and
columns (g) and (h) add the equity over assets ratio. Tests of equality strongly
reject in almost all cases, both for the equation as a whole and for our variables
of interest, the null of equality.
On the whole, it appears that most variables have a weaker influence in
more financially developed countries (i.e. in the subsample above the financial
development median) than in less financially developed one (i.e. the subsample
below the financial development median): the ratio of stock over assets, the size
(sales over assets) and interestingly, both proxies for financial health have much
stronger quantitative impact in the lower part of the sample. Interestingly, this is
also true for the difficulty of access to bank credit for specifications in columns
25 These estimations are, thus, made without time dummy variables, since these are perfectly
collinear with the private credit/GDP ratio.
26 These tests (standard tests based on Chi-square statistics) are shown solely for the key
variables of interest, namely size, credit access, and financial variables. Tests of equality for
other variables remain available upon request to the authors.
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Table 6: Credit access, financial structure, and financial development (I).
Dep. Var. TC/Assets (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Stock/Assets –0.001** –0.001** –0.001* 0.019 0.022 –0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004)
Receivables/Assets 0.291*** 0.278*** 0.259*** 0.196*** 0.182*** 0.272*** 0.259***
(0.090) (0.070) (0.070) (0.053) (0.052) (0.087) (0.092)
Sales/Assets 0.013*** –0.009 –0.023 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.011**
(0.005) (0.047) (0.048) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
(Sales/Assets)*priv.
cred./GDP
0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Credit access
(0–4)
–0.011 –0.009 –0.020 –0.008 –0.004 –0.019 –0.029
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
Credit access*priv.
cred./GDP
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash flow/Assets –0.087* –0.090*
(0.048) (0.048)
Cash flow/Assets*priv.
cred./GDP
0.0007* 0.0007*
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Equity/Assets –0.163* –0.181*
(0.090) (0.096)
Equity/Assets*priv.
cred./GDP
0.0015* 0.002*
(0.0008) (0.001)
Priv. cred./GDP –0.002** –0.002** –0.002* –0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 3,002 3,002 3,002 2,341 2,341 2,908 2,908
Number of firms 1,314 1,314 1,314 1,167 1,167 1,274 1,274
Estimation GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE
R2 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.32 0.34 0.42 0.44
Notes: All coefficients estimates are GLS estimates with firm-level random effects and year
dummies. In all estimations, the dependent variable is the ratio of accounts payable over total
assets. Right-hand side variables include: the size of the firm (the ratio of total sales over total
assets); the stock to total assets ratio; the accounts receivable to total assets ratio; a bank
credit access indicator taking a value between 0 and 4 according to whether the answer to the
question “Is access to bank loans an obstacle to business?” was “not at all, minor, moderate,
major, or severe”; the ratio of cash flow over total assets in columns (d) and (e); the ratio of
shareholders’ equity over total assets in columns (f) and (g). Interacted terms are also included
in columns (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) between the credit access, the ratios of cash flow and
equity over assets on the one hand, and the ratio of total credit granted to private sector over
GDP on the other hand. The latter is also included as an explanatory variable in columns (a), (b),
(d), and (f); alternatively, country dummies are included in columns (c), (e), and (g). Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Intercept not reported. Froot (1989) correction for firm-level
cluster correlation. Significance levels: *10, **5, and ***1%.
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(c)/(d) and (e)/(f). The only exception is the impact of the receivables to assets
ratio, which is quantitatively more important for countries with a high level of
financial development.
All these results are confirmed and strengthened by a further splitting of the
sample around the quartiles of financial development. Table 8 presents the
results for these subsamples: columns (a), (d), and (g) for the highest quartile;
columns (b), (e), and (h) on the intermediate quartiles;27 and columns (c), (f),
and (i) for the lowest quartile. Once again, Chi-square statistics for equality of
coefficients are provided for the all model and main coefficients of interest: in
columns (a), (d), and (g), the null tested is the equality of the coefficients
estimated on the highest quartile with those estimated on the intermediary
and lowest quartiles; in columns (c), (f), and (i), the null tested is the equality
of the coefficients estimated on the lowest quartile with those estimated on the
intermediary and highest quartiles. The null of global equality is rejected in all
cases but one.
The results are consistent with the ones presented in Table 7. In a nutshell,
they confirm that the impact on trade credit of firm-level specific characteristics
including size, stock over assets, and financial health indicators substantially
decreases when financial development is high enough (i.e. over the subsample
of observations located in the highest quartile of financial development). This is
also true for the bank credit access indicator, which is never significant anymore
in the highest quartile of financial development. Therefore, the result already
perceptible in columns (c), (d), (e), and (f) in Table 7 is fully confirmed: the
difficulty for accessing bank credit has a significant influence on the volume of
trade credit used among firms in the less financially developed countries, but
this influence is no longer significant with regard to usage of trade credit among
firms in more financially developed markets. This comes down to saying that
trade credit substitutes bank credit when the level of financial development is
low, but that this substitutability relationship no longer holds when financial
development is higher.
Put together, the results reported in Tables 6–8 support the idea that
heterogeneity in terms of level of financial development has a significant impact
on the relationship between bank credit access and trade credit, and more
generally on most other determinants of trade credit use, especially financial
health variables. Once again, the only exception is the impact of the receivables
to assets ratio, which is slightly more important for countries with a high level of
financial development. These findings can consistently be interpreted through a
27 Due to insufficient observations on the third quartile, we decided to perform estimations on
both the second and the third quartiles, under the name Intermediate.
Trade Credit, Bank Credit and Financial Development 29
Table 7: Credit access, financial structure, and financial development (II).
Dep. Var. :
TC/Assets
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
High Low High Low High Low High Low
Stock/Assets –0.002*** 0.082*** 0.026** 0.075** 0.032*** 0.060* 0.028** 0.016
(0.001) (0.031) (0.012) (0.031) (0.012) (0.031) (0.012) (0.031)
Sales/Assets 0.013** 0.037*** 0.009*** 0.035*** 0.025*** 0.044*** 0.009*** 0.045***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009)
Receivables/
Assets
0.331*** 0.193*** 0.334*** 0.178*** 0.332*** 0.176*** 0.334*** 0.120***
(0.119) (0.034) (0.017) (0.033) (0.017) (0.032) (0.017) (0.032)
Credit access
(0–4)
0.015*** 0.009** 0.002 0.008** 0.002 0.008** 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cash flow/
Assets
–0.010*** –0.217***
(0.003) (0.053)
Equity/Assets –0.000 –0.283***
(0.001) (0.033)
Observations 1,556 1,446 1,011 1,330 1,011 1,330 980 1,296
Number of firms 1,124 778 1,011 730 1,011 730 980 716
Estimation GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE
R2 0.48 0.15 0.44 0.15 0.45 0.16 0.45 0.25
Tests of equality
of coefficients
(χ2 statistic)
Chow global
equality test
27.47 11.50 15.69 39.09
p-Value 0.000 0.042 0.015 0.000
Credit access 5.79 6.05 4.91 2.68
p-value 0.0161 0.013 0.027 0.102
Cash flow/
Assets
12.30
p-Value 0.001
Equity/Assets 9.83
p-Value 0.002
Notes: All coefficients estimates are GLS estimates with firm-level random effects and year
dummies. In all estimations, the dependent variable is the ratio of accounts payable over total
assets. Right-hand side variables include: the size of the firm (the ratio of total sales over total
assets); the stock to total assets ratio; the accounts receivable to total assets ratio; a bank
credit access indicator taking a value between 0 and 4 according to whether the answer to the
question “Is access to bank loans an obstacle to business?” was “not at all, minor, moderate,
major, or severe”; the ratio of cash flow over total assets (columns (e) and (f)); the ratio of
shareholders’ equity over total assets (columns (g) and (h)). Robust standard errors in parenth-
eses. Intercept not reported. Froot (1989) correction for firm-level cluster correlation. High and
Low mean, respectively, above and below the median of the sample in terms of financial
development. Tests of equality of coefficients are based on Chi-squared statistics with the
number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters tested, that is, 5/6 (when
including our proxies for financial health) for global equality tests, and 1 for single-coefficient
tests. Significance levels: *10, **5, and ***1%.
30 J. Couppey-Soubeyran and J. Héricourt
Table 8: Credit access, financial structure, and financial development (III).
Dep. Var. TC/Assets (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Highest Intermediate Lowest Highest Intermediate Lowest Highest Intermediate Lowest
[0.75;1] ]0.25;0.75[ [0;0.25] [0.75;1] ]0.25;0.75[ [0;0.25] [0.75;1] ]0.25;0.75[ [0;0.25]
Stock/Assets 0.025*** 0.130*** 0.002* –0.005 0.122*** 0.179*** –0.008 0.056 0.129***
(0.010) (0.034) (0.001) (0.010) (0.036) (0.030) (0.010) (0.034) (0.022)
Sales/Assets 0.012*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.017*** 0.074*** 0.055*** 0.005* 0.075*** 0.041***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008)
Receivables/Assets 0.306*** 0.287*** 0.245*** 0.273*** 0.279*** 0.248*** 0.275*** 0.201*** 0.221***
(0.016) (0.034) (0.017) (0.027) (0.036) (0.026) (0.027) (0.034) (0.023)
Credit access (0–4) 0.003 0.011** 0.005* 0.001 0.010** 0.012** 0.001 0.004 0.011**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Cash flow/Assets –0.007*** –0.167** –0.029**
(0.002) (0.084) (0.012)
Equity/Assets –0.001 –0.291*** –0.042
(0.001) (0.028) (0.026)
Observations 1,120 702 1,180 926 637 713 926 637 713
Number of firms 1,120 702 1,180 926 637 713 926 637 713
Estimation GLS-RE GLS-RE GLS-RE
R2 0.43 0.17 0.51 0.30 0.18 0.47 0.29 0.30 0.47
Tests of equality of coefficients (χ2
statistic)
Chow global equality test 26.75 40.10 12.76 8.57 31.62 44.24
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Table 8: (Continued )
Dep. Var. TC/Assets (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Highest Intermediate Lowest Highest Intermediate Lowest Highest Intermediate Lowest
[0.75;1] ]0.25;0.75[ [0;0.25] [0.75;1] ]0.25;0.75[ [0;0.25] [0.75;1] ]0.25;0.75[ [0;0.25]
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.1999 0.000 0.000
Credit access 25.41 6.01 7.76 6.05 28.73 5.16
p-Value 0.000 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.000 0.023
Cash flow/Assets 0.06 0.48
p-Value 0.814 0.487
Equity/Assets 1.16 3.91
p-Value 0.282 0.048
Notes: All coefficients estimates are GLS estimates with firm-level random effects and year dummies. In all estimations, the dependent variable is the
ratio of accounts payable over total assets. Right-hand side variables include: the size of the firm (the ratio of total sales over total assets); the stock
to total assets ratio; the accounts receivable to total assets ratio; a bank credit access indicator taking a value between 0 and 4 according to whether
the answer to the question “Is access to bank loans an obstacle to business?” was “not at all, minor, moderate, major, or severe”; the ratio of cash
flow over total assets (columns (d), (e), and (f)); the ratio of shareholders’ equity over total assets (columns (g), (h), and (i)). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Intercept not reported. Froot (1989) correction for firm-level cluster correlation. Highest and Lowest mean that estimations have been
performed over subsamples of firms belonging, respectively, to the highest and lowest quartiles in terms of financial development. Intermediate
means that estimates have been performed over the subsample of the firm belonging to the second and third quartiles of financial development.
Tests of equality of coefficients are based on Chi-square statistics with the number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters tested,
that is, 5/6 when including our proxies for financial health for global equality tests, and 1 for single-coefficient tests. Columns (a), (d), and (g): H0: the
coefficients estimated on the highest quartile are equal to those estimated on the intermediary and lowest quartiles; columns (c), (f), and (i): H0: the
coefficients estimated on the lowest quartile are equal to those estimated on the intermediary and highest quartiles. Significance levels: *10, **5,
and ***1%.
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demand-side story: when financial development increases, firms have better
access to bank credit, and the impact of this variable on the demand for trade
credit becomes less or not significant. The same applies to financial health
indicators: when financial development is low, the level of cash flow or equity
matters decisively for the demand of trade credit; when financial development
increases, the size of the impact substantially decreases or even disappears. This
may mean that trade credit acts less as a safety valve for firms in an environment
where bank credit is more abundant and becomes more driven by other deter-
minants. However, it is beyond the scope of this article (and the possibilities
provided by the data) to tell what they are exactly, even if the consistent high
significance of the receivables over assets ratio could indicate that trade rela-
tionships themselves keep being an important determinant of trade credit use.
Our results fit well with the literature connecting the (complementarity/
substitution) relationship to financial constraints and financial development
on emerging markets (see Fisman and Love 2003, who show that businesses
use trade credit more extensively in countries with undeveloped banking sys-
tems; 1994; and Ge and Qiu 2007, who draw similar conclusions on a panel of
Chinese firms). On the theoretical side, our main findings validate the prediction
by Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) that trade credit is more prevalent in less-
developed credit markets.
6 Robustness analysis
6.1 Alternative specification for the credit assess indicator
In Table 9, we check that our results on our key variable, namely the bank credit
access, is robust to a more flexible specification, by replacing the index by four
dummies, taking the value 1 if access to bank credit was reported as, respec-
tively, a minor, moderate, major, or severe obstacle to business, 0 otherwise.
Columns (a)–(e) report marginal effects computed at means for continuous
regressors from a pooled probit estimation of eq. [1]; columns (f)–(j) display
the GLS estimates with firm-level random effects of eq. [2].
Whatever the sample or the specification (eq. [1] or eq. [2]) considered, our
results remain qualitatively almost identical, both for other variables and for the
dummies for access to credit: the relationship for all four dummies is clearly
positive and significant in almost all cases. Besides, no robust non-linear rela-
tionship emerges for the four credit access dummies. A U-shaped relationship
may be observed in some specifications, but standard tests (available upon
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Table 9: Alternative specification for the credit access indicator.
Dep. Var. Pr(TC/Assetss>0) TC/Assets
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Capital city –0.092*** –0.031** –0.097*** –0.063*** –0.072*** –0.067***
(0.029) (0.015) (0.031) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Age 0.025* 0.026** 0.011* 0.030** –0.015* –0.014* –0.017 –0.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Sales/Assets 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.023*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)* (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Stock/Assets –0.001 –0.001 –0.000 0.000 –0.004 –0.001** –0.001* –0.001 0.065 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.049) (0.004)
TD/Assets 0.289*** 0.290*** 0.276*** 0.113*** 0.281*** 0.290*** 0.288*** 0.290*** 0.272*** 0.292***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.045) (0.023) (0.043) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.080) (0.095)
1 if credit access is a
minor obstacle
0.060*** 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.029*** 0.053*** 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.066*** 0.044* 0.061**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.007) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025)
1 if credit access is a
moderate
obstacle
0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.020*** 0.048*** 0.038** 0.043** 0.040** 0.014 0.043**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017)
1 if credit access is a
major obstacle
0.060*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.023*** 0.051*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.032* 0.054***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
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1 if credit access is a
severe obstacle
0.069*** 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.030*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.044*** 0.066***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Cash flow/Assets –0.003* –0.011***
(0.002) (0.004)
Equity/Assets –0.012** –0.003*
(0.005) (0.001)
Observations 3,002 2,924 2,897 2,313 2,803 3,002 2,924 2,897 2,313 2,803
Number of
firms
1,314 1,279 1,264 1,151 1,224 1,314 1,279 1,264 1,151 1,224
Estimation Pooled probit GLS-RE
Pseudo-R2/R2 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.32 0.40
Notes: Columns (a)–(e): The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if the firm owes accounts payable, 0 otherwise; all coefficients estimates
are maximum likelihood estimates of a pooled probit model. Marginal effects computed at means for continuous regressors. Columns (f)–(j): the
dependent variable is the ratio of accounts payable over total assets; all coefficients estimates are GLS estimates with firm-level random effects. All
estimations include year and sector dummies. Right-hand side variables include in all specifications the size of the firm (the ratio of total sales over
total assets); the stock to total assets ratio; the accounts receivable to total assets ratio; a dummy variable taking the value 1 if access to bank credit
was reported as a minor obstacle to business, 0 otherwise; a dummy variable taking the value 1 if access to bank credit was reported as a moderate
obstacle to business, 0 otherwise; a dummy variable taking the value 1 if access to bank credit was reported as a major obstacle to business, 0
otherwise; a dummy variable taking the value 1 if access to bank credit was reported as a severe obstacle to business, 0 otherwise. In columns (b)–(e)
and (g)–(j) is also included the age; columns (c)–(e) and columns (h)–(j) add the presence in the capital city. The ratio of cash flow over total assets is
added in columns (d) and (i), and the ratio of shareholders’ equity over total assets appears in columns (e) and (j). Cluster-robust standard errors in
parentheses. Intercept not reported. Froot (1989) correction for firm-level cluster correlation. Significance levels: *10, **5, and ***1%.
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request) do not reject the null of equality of the different bank credit access
elasticities on several occasions. Relying on our discrete bank credit access
index appears, therefore, as a reasonable modeling choice.
6.2 Net trade credit as the dependent variable
It is common in the trade credit literature (see, among others, Ge and Qiu 2007 or
Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende 2007) to provide complementary analysis on the net
trade credit position, that is, to use the difference between payables and receivables
as the dependent variable. As a robustness, we decide, therefore, to perform addi-
tional estimations where our preferred dependent variable (accounts payable over
assets) is replaced by 1/ a binary indicator coded 1 if the firm has positive net trade
credit, that is, accounts payable greater than accounts receivable, 0 otherwise (eq.
[1]); 2/ an indicator of the net balance in terms of trade credit, defined as (accounts
payable – accounts receivable)/assets (eq. [2]).
Columns (a)–(c) in Table 10 report estimates (marginal effects computed at
means for continuous regressors) for the modified version of eq. [1], and col-
umns (d)–(h) display the results for the modified version of eq. [2]; in both cases,
the ratio of receivables over assets has obviously disappeared from the right-
hand side variables. All our main results are robust to this change, except for the
positive relationship between the difficulty for accessing bank credit and net
trade credit, that is, the substitution relationship between bank credit and trade
credit, which does not appear significant anymore in the linear specification (eq.
[2]). Financial health indicators remain significant for both the volume of trade
credit and the probability of owing trade credit; no major change appears for
other variables, which are significant most of the time – age has now a negative
impact in both models.
In order to be completely consistent, however, one would need to compare two
net debts and, therefore, to include in the regression the net bank debt of the firm,
that is, her bank debt minus her deposits. But, we have no information in theWBES
on firms’ bank debts or deposits. Our main research question revolves around the
relationship between trade and bank credit, and not their net balances. Results
presented in Table 10 should, therefore, be interpreted carefully.
6.3 Alternative test for endogeneity
As an alternative methodology for addressing endogeneity issues, we performed
an additional set of estimations relying on predetermined values for access to
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Table 10: Net trade credit, credit access, and financial structure.
Dep. Var. Pr(TC/Assets>0) (TC/Assets)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Capital city –0.141*** –0.105** –0.148*** –0.100** –0.102** –0.117***
(0.032) (0.045) (0.032) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
Age –0.070*** –0.126*** –0.061*** –0.034*** –0.045*** 0.044***
(0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
Sales/Assets 0.009 0.040** 0.014* –0.007 0.000 0.029* –0.016** 0.033**
(0.007) (0.018) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.015)
Stock/Assets 0.002 0.267*** 0.010
(0.002) (0.070) (0.007)
Credit access (0–4) 0.015** –0.001 0.016** 0.002 –0.005 –0.001
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Cash flow/Assets –0.075*** –0.011 –0.170***
(0.025) (0.009) (0.061)
Equity/Assets –0.075** –0.001 –0.288***
(0.030) (0.001) (0.045)
Observations 2,897 2,313 2,803 2,848 2,269 2,269 2,209 2,209
Number of firms 1,264 1,151 1,224 1,252 1,136 1,136 1,109 1,109
Estimation Pooled probit GLS-RE GLS-RE Within-FE GLS-RE Within-FE
Pseudo-R2/R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.14
Notes: Columns (a)–(c): The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if the firm has positive net trade credit, that is, accounts payable is
greater than accounts receivable, 0 otherwise; all coefficients estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of a pooled probit model. Marginal effects
computed at means for continuous regressors. All estimations include sector and year dummies. Columns (d)–(h): the dependent variable is the ratio
(Accounts payable – Accounts receivable)/Total assets; in columns (d), (e) and (g), all coefficients estimates are GLS estimates with firm-level random
effects; in columns (f) and (h), all estimates rely on the within-fixed effects estimator. All estimations include year and sector dummies, except in
columns (f) and (h) for the latter. Right-hand side variables include in all specifications: the size of the firm (the ratio of total sales over total assets);
the stock to total assets ratio. The presence in the capital city, the age of the firm and the bank credit access indicator appear in all columns but (f)
and (h), because they are subsumed in the fixed effects. The ratio of cash flow over total assets is included in columns (b), (e) and (f), and the ratio of
shareholders’ equity over total assets appears in columns (c), (g) and (h). Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Intercept not reported. Froot
(1989) correction for firm-level cluster correlation. Significance levels: *10, **5 and ***1%.
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Table 11: Alternative treatment for endogeneity.
Dep. Var. Pr(TC/Assets>0) TC/Assets
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Capital city –0.084*** –0.045** –0.085*** –0.070*** –0.069*** –0.058***
(0.027) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Age 0.023* 0.024** 0.014* 0.027*** –0.016 –0.015 –0.015 –0.008
(0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Pred_(Stock/Assets) 0.064*** 0.053*** 0.047*** 0.030*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.084***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023)
Pred_(Sales/Assets) –0.002 –0.002 –0.001 0.044* –0.006** –0.001 0.071* 0.084** 0.086** –0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.023) (0.003) (0.001) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.003)
Pred_(Receivables/
Assets)
0.235*** 0.225*** 0.220*** 0.132*** 0.213*** 0.331** 0.170 0.166 0.167 0.187*
(0.056) (0.052) (0.051) (0.030) (0.036) (0.140) (0.109) (0.107) (0.107) (0.109)
Credit access (0–4) 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.006** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Pred_(Cash Flow/
Assets)
–0.003 –0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Pred_(Equity/Assets) –0.008** –0.0012**
(0.004) (0.0006)
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Observations 3,002 2,924 2,897 2,319 2,801 3,002 2,346 2,319 2,319 2,801
Number of firms 1,314 1,279 1,264 1,142 1,214 1,314 1,157 1,142 1,142 1,214
Estimation Pooled probit GLS-RE
Pseudo-R2/R2 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.43
Notes: Columns (a)–(e): The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if the firm owes accounts payable, 0 otherwise; all coefficients estimates
are maximum likelihood estimates of a pooled probit model. Marginal effects computed at means for continuous regressors. Columns (f)–(j): the
dependent variable is the ratio of accounts payable over total assets; all coefficients estimates are GLS estimates with firm-level random effects. All
estimations include year and sector dummies. Right-hand side variables include, in all estimations: the size of the firm (the ratio of total sales over
total assets) set to its value available at the first year for each firm-country; the stock to total assets ratio set to its value available at the first year for
each firm-country; the accounts receivable to total assets ratio set to its value available at the first year for each firm-country; a bank credit access
indicator taking a value between 0 and 4 according to whether the answer to the question “Is access to bank loans an obstacle to business?” was
“not at all, minor, moderate, major, or severe”. In columns (b)–(e) and (g)–(j) is also included the age; columns (c)–(e) and columns (h)–(j) add the
presence in the capital city. The ratio of cash flow over total assets set to its value available at the first year for each firm-country is added in columns
(d) and (i); the ratio of shareholders’ equity over total assets set to its value available at the first year for each firm-country appears in columns (e) and
(j). Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Intercept not reported. Froot (1989) correction for firm-level cluster correlation. Significance levels:
*10, **5, and ***1%.
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bank credit along the lines of Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007) or Duchin,
Oguzhan, and Berk (2010). Both eqs [1] and [2] were estimated again, setting all
balance-sheet variables to their value at the first year available for each firm-
country.
Table 11 reports these estimates. Columns (a)–(e) report marginal effects
computed at means for continuous regressors from a pooled probit estimation of
eq. [1]; columns (f)–(j) display the GLS estimates with firm-level random effects
of eq. [2]. Main results are qualitatively unchanged, except for the cash flow over
assets ratio, with a compromised significance. If anything, the impact of age and
of the ratio of receivables over assets appears less robust for the linear
specification.
7 Conclusions
Using a cross-country firm-level database based on the World Bank’s
Investment Climate Survey, we studied the impact of financial development
on the traditional determinants of trade credit usage at the firm level in six
countries from the MENA region. Our results initially support the substitut-
ability of bank credit and trade credit; similarly, the indicators of the quality
of the firm’s financial structure negatively influence the use of trade credit,
emphasizing the utility of this form of credit for companies in precarious
financial health. However, additional investigations tend to suggest that
increased financial development significantly reduces (and can even make
disappear) the substitution relationship between trade credit and bank credit
and more generally decreases the influence of most firm-level determinants
for trade credit usage. This provides micro-evidence on the impact of finan-
cial development on the bank/trade credit relationship and hence empirical
support to the theoretical result of Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), who show
that trade credit is more prevalent in less-developed credit markets.
Moreover, the findings show that the phenomenon of trade credit is
demand-driven: when bank credit access gets increasingly difficult, or
when financial health deteriorates, the use of trade credit also increases.
This is more in favor of a demand-driven story (firms trying to compensate
bank credit, or a bad financial health, with trade credit) than a supply-driven
one (it is unlikely that suppliers would grant by their own will more trade
credit to credit-constrained firms). This also fits well with our key result
regarding financial development: when the latter increases, firms have better
access to bank credit, and the impact of this variable on the demand for
40 J. Couppey-Soubeyran and J. Héricourt
trade credit becomes less or not significant. Similar results arise for our
financial health indicators, with a much less clear impact on trade credit
use when financial development is high.
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